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INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, corporate failures of all sorts have
flooded this country. Because directors are supposed to manage
the affairs of the corporation, to what extent are they responsible
for these failures? If corporate disasters result from ineffective
management by boards of directors, when might members of a
board bear personal liability for losses caused to shareholders and
the company? Although directors must have played substantial
roles in these catastrophes, they have faced relatively little fingerpointing. Do boards of directors have any significant accountability
anymore for how they manage a corporation?
A case in point is the local, but nationally very large,
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (UHG). Backdated stock options were
allegedly granted to UHG’s former chief executive officer, former
1
general counsel, and its many other officers and employees. Thus,
the following lawsuits were brought against these parties and, in
some cases, the company itself. The Securities and Exchange
Commission brought civil actions against the CEO, the general
2
counsel, and UHG. A class action suit for violation of the federal

1. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
2006, at A1 (reporting options granted to members of the board of directors were
apparently not backdated).
2. Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. McGuire, (No. 06CV01216), 631 F.
Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2007), 2007 WL 4298731 [hereinafter SEC
Complaint].

3. Hogg-Triggs.docx

72

11/18/2009 1:29 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1
3

securities laws was brought in federal district court. A derivative
4
action was brought in federal district court and another derivative
5
action was brought in Minnesota state court.
The CEO and general counsel faced injunctions and severe
penalties imposed by the SEC, and while UHG neither admitted
nor denied the SEC’s allegations, the court enjoined the company
6
from further specified violations of the federal securities laws.
Pursuant to a preliminarily approved settlement of the class action
suit, UHG paid $895 million into a settlement fund for the benefit
7
of class members given the alleged federal securities law violations.
Recently, the state and federal plaintiffs’ counsel sought a
combined attorneys’ fee award of $64 million, which UHG
8
contested.
A proposed settlement of both federal and state derivative suits
was reached by a special litigation committee (SLC) with the
former CEO, the former general counsel, and a former member of
9
the board. Subject to the individual settlement agreements, the
3. Consolidated Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig.,
No. 0:06-cv-01691-JMR-FLN, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94344 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2006),
2006 WL 3716007 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint], (referring to 17 C.F.R. §
240.10(b)(5) (2006)); see also STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IN COOPERATION WITH
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, COMPANY AND CASE
INFORMATION, UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., available at http://securities.stanford
.edu/1036/UNH_01/ [hereinafter STANFORD REPORT].
4. See, e.g., Lead Plaintiffs’ Amended and Consolidated Verified Derivative
and Class Action Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., No. 06-1216 JMR/FLN, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2006), 2006
WL 2791649 [hereinafter Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action
Complaint].
5. Consolidated Derivative Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
Derivative Litig., No. 27-CV-06-8085 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.gardylaw.com/docs/155-Complaint%208-14-06.pdf [hereinafter State
Consolidated Derivative Complaint].
6. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 06-CV-1216
JMR/FLN, 06-CV-1691 JMR/FLN, 2007 WL 4571127 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007)
(noting that the civil fine was the “largest ever assessed by the SEC”); In re
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn.
2008).
7. STANFORD REPORT, supra note 3.
8. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Lead Plaintiffs’
Counsel’s Fee Applications, In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., Nos. 06-1216 (JMR/FLN), 27 CV 06-8085, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn.
Feb. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 319525.
9. See Report of the Special Litigation Committee ¶ 4, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. McGuire, No. 06CV01216, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2007), 2007
WL 4298730 [hereinafter SLC Report] (the former member of the board,
coincidentally, was also former chairman of the compensation committee).
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SLC recommended that all claims against all named defendants in
the derivative actions, including current and former UHG officers
10
The proposed settlement
and directors, should be dismissed.
agreements received approval by both the state and federal
11
courts. Although these suits have been settled or remain subject
to approved settlements, no member of the board of directors,
other than the former CEO and former general counsel, has
12
apparently been found liable.
The shareholders filed well-pleaded complaints in both the
federal and state derivative actions. Furthermore, they filed a wellpleaded and subsequently class-action-certified complaint, alleging
that the defendants violated federal securities laws.
The
13
defendants even paid $895 million to settle that complaint.
Despite these facts, there has been no adjudication in a court of law
of the UHG board’s responsibility or accountability.
The
appointment and report of the SLC finessed any such adjudication
without showing any findings of fact and reasons supporting its
14
conclusions. And so, Minnesota courts effectively disposed of the
factual allegations in these well-pleaded derivative actions, directed
at the behavior and actions of certain members of the board,
without reviewing findings of fact or reasoning behind the SLC’s
conclusions.
How could this happen?
The story is long,
complicated, and intriguing.
To understand how a board-appointed committee can
convince a court to dismiss and settle a derivative suit without
showing detailed justification, it is appropriate to review the statutes,
case law, and theoretical concepts behind derivative suits. Thus,
this article first focuses on the current framework under Minnesota
15
law governing corporate directors’ duties and responsibilities, the
16
business judgment rule, and the shareholders’ opportunity to
10. Id.
11. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1151 (D. Minn. 2009); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., No. 27-CV-06-8085 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. May 14, 2009), available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/News/Orders/UnitedHealth_Gro
up_Incorporated_5-14-09.pdf.
12. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.
13. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10Q), at 22 (May 7,
2009) [hereinafter 10Q Report], available at http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/
invest/2009/UHG_Q1_2009_10-Q_FINAL.pdf .
14. See SLC Report, supra note 9.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.A.
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bring derivative suits.
Then, this article analyzes how these
18
In the fourth section, the story
matters are handled by SLCs.
finally reaches the derivative suit against UHG, where the reader
will see how it was dismissed and settled with minimal judicial
19
The fifth part analyzes the standard the Minnesota
review.
Supreme Court adopted for reviewing SLC decisions to dismiss and
20
The sixth and final portion assesses the
settle derivative suits.
21
scope of continuing director accountability in Minnesota.
II. THE CURRENT CORPORATE LIABILITY FRAMEWORK IN
MINNESOTA
A. Directors’ Duties and Liabilities
Our story begins with Minnesota Statutes section 302A.201,
which provides that Minnesota corporations shall be managed “by
22
or under the direction of a board.” Section 302A.251 continues
and defines the fiduciary duties of directors: “[a] director shall
discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person
23
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”
Those words could lead the reader to assume that a director is
responsible for negligence in discharging his or her duties. But in
Minnesota and across the country, this straightforward reading is
subject to an important interpretational gloss that covers these
words. When a director is sued for his or her allegedly negligent
conduct, the director will be excused from liability where the
director made “an informed business decision, in good faith, [and]
24
without an abuse of discretion.”
Significantly, the director receives the benefit of the
25
presumption that his or her actions complied with that standard.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part VI.
22. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subdiv. 1 (2008).
23. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008).
24. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003).
25. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d
544, 551 (Minn. 2008). See also MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2008). “[T]he board of
directors is presumed to be disinterested and to have acted on an informed basis,
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Even if a director makes a decision that subsequently harms the
corporation, despite the statute’s express language, the director is
excused from liability provided that the error was made in good
26
This interpretation is
faith and based on reasonable inquiry.
27
known as the “business judgment rule.” Courts recognize that
28
directors manage risk-taking in their everyday decisions.
Assuming the decisions are well-informed, courts should not judge
the decisions, in the light of hindsight, on the basis that directors
29
were negligent for assuming a particular risk. Simply put, courts
do not hold directors liable for business decisions just because the
decisions did not produce the best result for the corporation.
To defeat this presumption, the plaintiff must plead facts that,
if true, would show that a director either made a poorly informed
decision or acted in bad faith, thereby breaching the duty of care
30
Before examining how the
or the duty of loyalty respectively.
business judgment rule relates to derivative suits, the reader should
first understand that settlements, not verdicts, are the most
common results of director or officer misconduct. Part of the
reason for this can be explained by the concepts behind
indemnification and directors’ and officers’ insurance.
B. Indemnification: Smith v. VanGorkom’s Effect on Director’s
Accountability
A director who breaches the duty of care in Minnesota is
entitled to indemnification in accordance with section 302A.521 of

in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the corporation.” Michael Dooley & Norman Veasey, The Role of the
Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44
BUS. LAW. 503, 504–05 (1989) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)). “Because of this presumption of sound business judgment, the board’s
decisions ‘will not be disturbed by court if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose.’” Id. at 505 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971)).
26. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008).
27. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 39 (5th ed. 1998).
The Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that section 302A.251 is the codified
version of Minnesota’s business judgment rule. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn. 2008).
28. See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003).
29. Dooley, supra note 25, at 519.
30. See, e.g., Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58–59 (Minn. 1982); BLOCK ,
supra note 27, at 27–28.
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31

the Minnesota Statutes.
The same section allows the board to
32
advance defense costs subject to board approval and control.
Indemnification provides effective protection for a director if the
board is friendly, if the corporation has the requisite assets to satisfy
33
the obligation, and if the director meets the statutory standard.
Moreover, as a condition of accepting their appointment to the
board, many directors request or require that the corporation
provide Directors and Officers (hereinafter “D&O”) insurance
34
These policies, which are frequently written in
coverage.
35
indemnification and not defense coverage format, may provide
insurance coverage to individual directors as well as to the
36
corporation itself. Thus, short of fraud, bad faith, or certain kinds
of illegal behavior, a director could reasonably expect to avoid
personal liability given the availability of indemnification or
37
insurance coverage.
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Smith v. Van

31. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a)(1)–(5) (2008). A director could be
indemnified if he or she:
(1) has not been indemnified by another organization [for the same
lawsuit] . . . ; (2) acted in good faith; (3) received no improper personal
benefit and section 302A.255, if applicable, has been satisfied; (4) in the
case of a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the
conduct was unlawful; and (5) in the case of acts or omissions occurring
in the official capacity . . . reasonably believed that the conduct was in the
best interests of the corporation[,] or [for director, officer, employee, or
agent of the corporation who serves at the request of the corporation for
another organization,] reasonably believed that the conduct was not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation.
Id.
32. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 6(a)(1) (2008) (“All determinations
whether indemnification . . . is required . . . shall be made . . . by the board by a
majority of a quorum, if the directors who are at the time parties to the
proceeding are not counted for determining either a majority or the presence of a
quorum . . . .”).
33. As a matter of fact, a corporation needs indemnification to recruit future
directors; otherwise, no reasonable candidate would agree to serve in a position
that could expose him or her to liability for losses that range in the millions. See 2
DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1853 (5th ed. 1998).
34. Id. at 1853–54.
35. See David M. Balabanian, Civil RICO Litigation, 313 PLI/LIT 675, 677
(1986) (“The typical D & O policy is written as an ‘indemnity’ policy, not a
‘liability’ policy.”).
36. Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and
Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 783 (1987).
37. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a) (2008).
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38

Gorkom, holding the entire board of directors of the Trans Union
Corporation liable for gross negligence by reason of not paying
sufficient attention to a transaction involving the sale of the
39
Insurers writing D&O coverage grew nervous about
business.
40
As a result, the market for
their possible financial exposures.
41
Some directors in
obtaining such coverage became thin.
Minnesota are said to have resigned shortly after this decision due
to their concerns about the continuing availability of reasonably
42
priced and termed D&O coverage.
In response, the Delaware Bar promptly stepped up to the
plate. It drafted and then negotiated through the Delaware
Legislature a statutory amendment authorizing shareholders to
amend corporate articles of incorporation so as to immunize
directors from liability for negligent performance of their duties as
43
members of the board. The Minnesota Legislature, at the urging
of the corporate bar, promptly copied that statute into Minnesota
44
Many Minnesota corporations then obtained favorable
law.
shareholder votes amending articles so as to provide the

38. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
39. See id. at 864. Very recently, this case was overruled by the Delaware
Supreme Court decision, Gantler v. Stephens, but for different reasons. Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009). Van Gorkom held that shareholder
ratification of a director’s decision extinguished the shareholder claim completely.
488 A.2d at 889–90. Now, that is not necessarily the case; the challenged director
decision remains subject to the business judgment rule (unless the claim asserted
lack of authority). Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713.
40. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24–25 (1989).
41. Id.
42. See Laurie Baum with John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, BUS. WK., Sept.
8, 1986, at 56.
43. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). “Section 102(b)(7) was
signed into law on June 18, 1986 and became effective July 1, 1986.” Ronald E.
Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Crisis:
Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 472 n.92 (1987). There were
however, restrictions on the indemnification provided:
[S]uch provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of
this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the
liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date
when such provision becomes effective.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
44. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a)(1)–(5) (1986).
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appropriate immunization for negligence (but not breach of duty
45
of loyalty, bad faith, or illegal misconduct) by directors.
In Minnesota, a finding of breach of duty of loyalty, bad faith,
or illegal misconduct generally requires either an admission, a
determination by a disinterested board, or an adjudication of such
a finding. Absent an admission or finding of such liability,
46
Consequently, settlement of a
indemnification is mandatory.
lawsuit, rather than adjudication, makes it likely that a director will
47
qualify for indemnification or insurance coverage or both.
Except as covered by insurance, the liability for the loss is then
shifted from the director to the corporation and thus to the
48
shareholders generally.
Plaintiffs in both derivative and securities law violation cases
often settle rather than litigate to adjudication for various reasons,
one being that adjudicated violations of the federal securities laws
49
Thus, a
are neither indemnifiable nor generally insurable.
plaintiff who pursues the case to final judicial determination runs
the risk of recovering only from the pocket of the defendant rather
than the presumptively much more ample pocket of the company
50
or the insurer.
Additionally, settlements are often attractive to plaintiffs faced
with problems of proof, such as the requisite scienter under Rule
51
The central question for the director (and for the
10b-5.
corporation and its shareholders in terms of who bears the loss)
often becomes not so much whether the lawsuit has merit
(although that remains important), but rather who should be able
45. See, e.g., Third Restated Articles of Incorporation of UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated, Section 7(a), available at http://unitedhealthgroup.com/about/
third_amended_and_restated_articles_of_incorporation.pdf.
46. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a) (2008). It is of course subject to
statutory limitations as well. Id.
47. The absence of a finding of liability increases the probability that an
insurer will provide coverage under a D&O policy. Cf. BLOCK, supra note 33, at
1851 (“The more likely it is that lawsuits against directors will not be resolved in
favor of directors at an early stage of litigation, the more likely it is that
indemnifiable and/or insured against defense costs (particularly attorneys’ fees)
will be high . . .”).
48. This brings the concept of indemnification to the public policy criticism
that corporate funds should not be used to excuse directors for misconduct. See
id. at 1969.
49. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1097–98 (2006).
50. See id.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
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to decide whether the lawsuit should be settled and, if so, on what
terms to settle the suit.
Now that settlements have become the focus of our discussion,
we can explore how they are handled in derivative suits under the
guidance of the business judgment rule.
C. Shareholders’ Remedies: The Derivative Suit
1. The Basics: How It Differs from Class Actions and How It Was
Used in UnitedHealth.
When shareholders allege that the directors have violated the
duty of care or the duty of loyalty, and the injury is to all
shareholders alike, then any suit alleging liability must be brought
in the name of the corporation and for the benefit of all the
52
shareholders. In these circumstances, permitting individual suits
53
Only
by separate shareholders would waste time and money.
where the plaintiff can allege separate and distinct injury to him or
54
herself may the plaintiff sue directly and not derivatively. Suits
brought on behalf of all shareholders, then, are denoted as
55
“derivative.”
Thus, the state and federal derivative suits against officers and
directors of UHG were brought in the name of UHG and for the
56
benefit of all shareholders alike. On the other hand, the class
action suit for alleged violation of the federal securities laws was
brought to recover for loss caused to the individual members of the
57
For instance, a shareholder who had bought or sold in
class.
reliance on the misstated financials issued by the corporation
during the class period would sue for his or her own recovery and

52. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1379–80 (quoting Kamen v. Kemper
Fin. Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991)).
53. 2 COX & HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 15.03 (2d ed. 2003).
54. Id. § 15.02.
55. BLOCK, supra note 33, at 1380 (“[t]he claim is brought derivatively because
‘those in control of the company refuse or fail to assert’ the claim belonging to
the corporation”) (quoting Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254,
264 (Del. 1995)).
56. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra
note 4 (in the Prayer for Relief, the shareholder plaintiffs asked for relief to be
granted to UHG).
57. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 3 (in their prayer for relief, the
plaintiffs did not ask for “injunctive relief in favor of the corporation,” but rather
in favor of themselves).
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58

The Stages of the Derivative Suit

A derivative suit is a potential asset of the corporation, and as
such, is subject to the control and management of the board
unless, for any reason, the board is disqualified from fairly
59
exercising such control and management. This concept can be
traced back to its origins in a case before an English court in the
60
early 1800s.
Given the board’s authority to control derivative suits, a
potential plaintiff must either make a demand on the board that it
61
bring suit against the wrongdoers, or allege to the court with
particularity that, due to having a conflict of interest, the board is

58. Justice Frankfurter depicts a good example: “if a corporation rearranges
the relationship of different classes of security-holders to the detriment of one
class, a stockholder in the disadvantaged class may proceed against the
corporation . . . .” 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, § 15.02 (citing Smith v.
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). In UnitedHealth, the
corporation (shareholders generally) paid the individual members of the class
$895 million under the terms of the settlement. See STANFORD REPORT, supra note
3.
59. BLOCK, supra note 33, at 1380. The derivative suit nevertheless equates to
the procedure by which shareholders “compel the corporation to sue.” Id. at 1381
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
60. Hidrens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828). More derivative cases
followed Hidrens. In one case, two shareholders of a corporation, the Victoria Park
Company, sued the directors for fraud and other “illegal transactions.” Hawes v.
City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454–55 (1881) (referring to Foss v. Harbottle, 67
Eng. Rep. 189 (1843)). The court upheld the defendant directors’ demurrer
motion because the plaintiffs neither obtained an action from the majority of the
shareholders nor showed that no acting board could otherwise bring the suit. Id.
More simply put, minority shareholders should not litigate internal disputes
because the corporation, as an entity, must first decide whether litigation is even
appropriate. Id. Therefore, either the majority of shareholders or the directors
decided this matter unless they abused that power through fraud or other illegal
conduct. See id. (referring to MacDougall v. Gardiner, (1875) 1 Ch.D. 13). As
shown by Hawes, U.S. courts still required shareholders to first “induce remedial
action” by the board so long as it was feasible. Id. at 460–61.
61. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, § 15.06 (citing a number of cases as
examples, including Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460–61 (1882); Barr
v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975); and Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A.
411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924)). “The demand must, at a minimum, ‘identify the
alleged wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the wrongful acts and the harm
caused to the corporation, and request remedial relief.’” 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 33, at 1428 (quoting Allison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117
(D. Del.), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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incapable of asserting or maintaining the lawsuit.
Should the
plaintiff make a demand, at least under applicable Delaware law,
the plaintiff confesses that the board can control and manage the
63
In the absence of a conflict of interest, the
lawsuit effectively.
board’s decision with respect to the demand and the maintenance
or termination of the suit is reviewed under the business judgment
64
rule.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff alleges with particularity
that the board is, by reason of conflict of interest, incapable of such
management, then the court may recognize that demand would be
65
If the plaintiff’s claim survives a dismissal motion, the
futile.
lawsuit is up and running and outside the management and control
66
of the board.
In both the federal and state derivative suits involving UHG,
67
the plaintiffs alleged such a conflict and there was no dismissal of
68
the complaints on the pleadings. Now the reader could assume
that if the plaintiff could survive a challenge to the allegation that
the board was conflicted, then the plaintiff’s suit would proceed to
trial without further interference from the board. This, however, is
62. Nevertheless, shareholders may surpass this requirement by showing that
their demand was either futile or “wrongfully refused.” 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note
33, at 1454–55. Wrongful refusal typically happens when the board negligently
decides to forego a derivative suit or acts in bad faith. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 33, at 1608–1609 (citing Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1994)); see
also 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, at 928–29 (citing Atkins v. Hibernia Corp., 182
F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).
63. See, e.g., Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421, 423 (Del. 1983).
64. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261, 263, 37 S.Ct. 509, 510 (1917); 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1454–55; see E.
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate
Law and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1465–1466 (2005).
65. Demand futility commonly occurs when the directors commit the
misconduct at issue. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, at 922 (citing Wolgin v.
Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1984)). It also occurs when the directors are
otherwise interested in the legal matter. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1467–
68 (citing Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 228 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1990)).
66. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, at 922.
67. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra
note 4, at ¶ 272 (“Plaintiffs did not make a demand . . . because . . . there is not a
majority of disinterested and independent directors on UnitedHealth’s board to
appropriately consider a demand as all of UnitedHealth’s twelve directors have
disabling interests or conflicts. As such, demand should be excused.”).
68. See In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV1216 (JMR/FLN), 06-CV-1691 (JMR/FLN), 2007 WL 4571127 (D. Minn. Dec. 26,
2007) (by this point, the court had not dismissed any of the complaints).
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69

not the case. Boards have been given broad authority to create
committees and charge those committees with conduct of board
70
This authority includes managing
business as delegated.
71
lawsuits. But could a board that was itself conflicted nevertheless
appoint a committee of persons who were not members of the
board and charge them with authority to manage and even dismiss
the case? Could such a committee so appointed do something that
the board itself could not do?
72
In Zapata v. Maldonado, a derivative complaint was filed in
Delaware alleging that demand should be excused because of
73
The conflicted board appointed an SLC
board conflict.
74
consisting of persons who were not board members. The SLC
then moved to terminate the lawsuit as being not in the best
75
interests of the corporation. The plaintiff challenged the ability
of a conflicted board to so act, but the Delaware Supreme Court
held that, subject to conditions reviewed below, such an SLC could
decide effectively that the lawsuit be terminated, thus cutting the
76
ground out from underneath the plaintiff. Two years earlier, the
77
New York Court of Appeals held in Auerbach v. Bennett that in a
similar situation an SLC could so decide, but its decision would
78
receive significantly greater judicial deference than that in Zapata.
The following section shows how directors can appoint an
69. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1979). The
court rejected the shareholder plaintiffs’ argument, in the words derived from
Lasker v. Burks, that “disinterested directors of an investment company do not have
the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by
shareholders against majority directors for breach of their fiduciary duties.” Id. at
728 (quoting Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d 441 U.S.
471 (1979)). The reason was that the Lasker decision was later reversed. See Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct. 1831 (1979). The Abbey court concluded that an
independent committee, appointed even by a minority of the board members,
enjoyed business judgment rule protection since the business judgment rule
“applies to any reasonable good faith determination by an independent board of
directors that the derivative action is not in the best interests of the corporation.”
Abbey, 603 F.2d at 730.
70. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 (2008).
71. Id. at subdiv. 1.
72. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
73. Id. at 780.
74. Id. at 781.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 789 (“If the Court’s independent business judgment is satisfied, the
Court may proceed to grant the motion, subject, of course, to any equitable terms
or conditions the Court finds necessary or desirable.”).
77. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
78. See id. at 999–1000; see also Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788–89.

3. Hogg-Triggs.docx

2009]

11/18/2009 1:29 PM

WELL-PLEAD DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS

83

independent SLC even though that suit is based on a well-pleaded
conflict of interest with respect to the board. Because an SLC can
trump a well-pleaded complaint, the reader should keep in mind
that the rules relating to selection of the members of an SLC,
delegation of authority to the SLC, and performance of the
responsibilities so delegated by the SLC, should be subject to some
measure of judicial oversight and review.
III. SLCS
A. Auerbach and Zapata: Minnesota’s Starting Point for Reviewing
SLCs.
Minnesota courts have reviewed SLC decisions under the
79
guidance of the business judgment rule. Under this rule, courts
have upheld SLC decisions if the SLC was independent from the
corporation and investigated the matter adequately and in good
80
faith. Prior to UnitedHealth, it was unclear under Minnesota law
whether SLC recommendations required factual support or merely
a showing that the SLC investigated the suit adequately and in good
81
Across the country, two conflicting ideas developed with
faith.
respect to how strictly courts should review SLC recommendations.
82
In Auerbach v. Bennet, the New York Court of Appeals limited
judicial review to assessing whether the SLC independently
investigated the derivative suit with appropriate procedure and in
83
The underlying derivative complaint in that case
good faith.
alleged that certain members of the board were involved in illegal

79. See Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003). See
also MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2008).
80. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209–10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
While this standard was not expressly accepted in Janssen, it was nevertheless
applied by Janssen without any changes. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884.
81. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007).
82. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
83. Id. at 1002–03. The question of adequacy regarding investigatory
methods depends on the “nature and characteristics of the particular subject
being investigated . . . .” Id. at 1003. In this case, the SLC consisted of three
members, which decided the outcome of a suit against four directors of a fifteenmember board. Id. at 1001. The court upheld the SLC’s motion to dismiss the
suit, because the committee selected the appropriate procedures. Id. at 1002. The
court went on to say that the decision was thus properly based on the investigation
and was outside the scope of review. Id.
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overseas payments (bribes) over a period of years.
The board
appointed an SLC consisting of three directors who joined the
85
board after the occurrence of these alleged payments. The SLC
was given full authority (without review by the board) to handle the
86
Based on the SLC’s decision, the supreme court
lawsuit.
dismissed the plaintiff’s suit; subsequently, however, the appellate
87
division reversed.
On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals sustained
dismissal of the complaint, concluding that “the determination of
the special litigation committee forecloses further judicial inquiry
88
in this case.” The business judgment rule required this outcome
“absent evidence of bad faith or fraud (of which there is none
89
The court observed that “the business judgment rule
here).”
does not foreclose inquiry by the courts into the disinterested
independence of those members of the board chosen by it to make
the corporate decision on its behalf” but concluded that nothing in
the record raised a triable fact issue regarding the SLC’s
90
independence. The court further recognized that “the selection
of procedures” was appropriate and “the ultimate substantive
decision . . . not to pursue the claims” was based on these
91
Under this recognition, the court concluded that
procedures.
there was no need to examine the substantive findings, for doing so
92
would intrude improperly on the business judgment rule.
93
In Zapata v. Maldonado, the Delaware Supreme Court
introduced a potentially stricter judicial scrutiny of SLC decisions,
suggesting the importance of ensuring that the SLC report would
94
This court
contain findings and well reasoned conclusions.
prescribed a two-step standard.
The first step involved an
84. Id. at 997.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 998.
88. Id. at 1000.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1001.
91. Id. at 1002.
92. Id.
93. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
94. See id. In this case, a stockholder brought action to recover against ten
officers and directors for breaches of fiduciary duties. Id. at 780. The board
elected an SLC, which concluded that the derivative suit should be dismissed. Id.
at 781. The defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Id. at 780. The
trial court granted the summary judgment motion and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
at 781.
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assessment of the SLC’s good faith and independence similar to
95
The court retained, however, a second
the Auerbach process.
discretionary step, in which it might exercise its own “business
judgment” in determining whether to grant the SLC’s motion to
96
dismiss the derivative suit. Delaware courts have not applied the
second step in every case, but rather only when “corporate actions
meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to
satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply
prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further
97
consideration in the corporation’s interest.”
The Zapata court supported its adoption of this two-step
standard by emphasizing that if SLCs are not required to provide
substantive support for their recommendations, “corporations can
consistently wrest bona fide derivative actions away from wellmeaning derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee
mechanism,” causing the derivative suit to lose effectiveness as a
98
policing tool.
B. How the Conflict Between Auerbach and Zapata Influenced
Minnesota Case Law Before UnitedHealth.
Prior to UnitedHealth, Minnesota courts seemingly applied the
Auerbach standard, but had not explicitly disavowed review of the
99
SLC report in the “business judgment” of the court. Nevertheless,
the history behind the Auerbach-Zapata clash in Minnesota helps
illustrate how the UnitedHealth court decided which standard of
review to choose.
The Minnesota legislature codified the permitted use of SLCs
100
For the first time since this codification, the Minnesota
in 1981.
Court of Appeals confronted the issue of how it should review an
95. Id. at 788. However, the task of ensuring good faith and independence
included substantively reviewing the SLC’s findings. See id. at 788–89.
96. Id. at 789.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 786.
99. See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 2003)
(acknowledging the past support for the Auerbach standard yet declining to affirm
whether a more exacting standard of review is necessary).
100. Act of May 27, 1981, ch. 270, § 43, 1981 Minn. Laws 1141, 1168 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1982)), repealed by Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 172, § 11, 1989
Minn. Laws 421, 429. The state statute mandated that SLCs shall be composed of
either two or more disinterested directors or independent persons to decide
whether pursuing litigation will best serve the corporation. MINN. STAT. §
302A.243 (1982).
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101

SLC report in Black v. NuAire, Inc.
Nuaire Inc. (“Nuaire”)
designed, produced, and sold air filtering devices for medical and
102
The plaintiff was a NuAire shareholder who
industrial research.
alleged that NuAire breached the duty of loyalty by awarding Max
Peters, a director and major shareholder, grossly excessive
103
compensation.
Thereafter, an independent member of the NuAire board
appointed an SLC, which concluded that except for a deferred
compensation agreement entered into with Max Peters, all other
104
Hence, the SLC proposed terminating
charges were meritless.
the lawsuit so long as the board would rescind the deferred
105
Once the board rescinded the
compensation agreement.
agreement, the trial court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the
SLC had been comprised of disinterested members and
106
investigated the matter in good faith.
On appeal, the plaintiffs asked the court to review the merits
107
The court of appeals
of the committee’s recommendations.
declined, stating that “the trial court properly limited its inquiry to
whether the appointed committee members were disinterested
within the meaning of section 302A.243 and conducted their
108
investigation in good faith.”
109
The court of appeals revisited this issue in Drilling v. Berman.
In Drilling, the court examined how subsequent Minnesota
legislation had affected the issue of reviewability of SLC decisions:
Prior to 1989, Minn. Stat. § 302A.243 (1988) restricted
judicial review of a special litigation committee decision to
terminate a derivative suit to a determination of whether
the committee was disinterested and made its decision in
good faith. In 1989, the legislature repealed Minn. Stat. §
302A.243. In repealing the section, the legislature made it
101. 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
102. Id. at 205.
103. See id. at 205–06. Additional allegations included: “(1) wrongful hiring of
relatives; (2) excessive salaries and business expenses; (3) wrongful Turnpike
Investment transactions; (4) illegal diversion of NuAire funds; (5) secrecy and
concealment of unlawful acts; (6) failure to pay dividends; and (7) excessive fringe
benefits[.]” Id. at 206.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 206–07.
106. Id. at 207.
107. Id. at 208–09.
108. Id. at 211.
109. 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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clear it was not commenting on the substance of the
section and that its repeal ‘must be interpreted in the
same manner as if section 302A.243 had not been
enacted.’ The legislature took that action in recognition
that Minnesota was one of the few states with legislation
governing judicial review of special litigation committees.
The repeal represented ‘a commitment to let the caselaw
110
develop,’ and a desire to give our courts flexibility.
The Drilling court acknowledged the thoroughness of the SLC
process: the SLC “reviewed thousands of documents provided by
111
the parties. It also interviewed four witnesses.” But the plaintiffs
argued that the SLC failed to demonstrate good faith because their
112
The court countered that good
conclusions were not explained.
faith is not measured by the substance, but rather the nature of the
113
To measure the adequacy of the SLC’s
investigation.
investigation, the Drilling court adopted factors used by the
114
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Boyd, which included:
“(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the committee’s
use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the corporation’s or the
defendant’s involvement, if any, in the investigation, and (4) the
adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to the
115
committee.”
Thus far, the appellate court decisions suggested that perhaps
the Auerbach approach provided the appropriate standard of review
for SLC decisions in Minnesota. Prior to the UnitedHealth case
116
however, Janssen v. Best & Flanagan was the only Minnesota
117
In Janssen, a
Supreme Court decision that addressed this issue.
derivative suit was brought by a nonprofit corporation, the
Minneapolis Police Relief Association (“MPRA”), for an alleged
118
The investment
negligently conducted business investment.

110. Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 507.
113. Id. at 509. The court further clarified that good faith is not shown by
proper substantive support but rather appropriate procedures and methodologies.
Id.
114. 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
115. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 509 (citing Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224). Note that
none of these factors pertain to the factual basis for conclusions and
recommendations.
116. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 879.
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119

allegedly cost the company $15 million.
Unlike the general
Minnesota corporation statute, the nonprofit statute, chapter 317A,
did not have a provision comparable to section 302A.241 expressly
120
authorizing the appointment of SLCs. Nevertheless, the supreme
court held that the power to do so was necessarily implicit in the
121
nonprofit statute.
The Janssen case illustrates that SLCs are not necessarily
infallible. The MPRA appointed Robert A. Murnane, an attorney,
122
The MPRA specifically
to investigate the derivative suit.
instructed Murnane not to review the “factual findings,
determinations, events or circumstances” described in prior reports
123
Because this
and discovery materials in a similar lawsuit.
instruction restricted the scope of the SLC investigation, the
supreme court agreed with the lower court that “Murnane, as a
special litigation committee, failed to meet the threshold test of
independence and good faith,” and allowed the lawsuit to
124
proceed.
In so ruling, the court further critiqued Murnane’s
investigation on which he based his conclusion as SLC:
In addition, we conclude that Murnane did not engage in
a good faith attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA
with respect to the litigation against Best & Flanagan.
Murnane never interviewed Janssen or their attorneys, a
fundamental task in reaching an informed decision about
the merits of their complaints. Murnane also gave no
indication that he had undertaken the careful
consideration of all the germane benefits and detriments
to MPRA that is indicative of a good faith business
125
decision.
The court then refused to recognize the subsequent attempt of
the MPRA to give Murnane a general and unlimited instruction
holding that the initial delegation of authority to the SLC must be
complete and not subject to subsequent amendment or further
119. Id.
120. MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 (2008).
121. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883–84, 88.
122. Id. at 880.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 888. This rule is otherwise known as the one-strike rule. For an
analysis of the one-strike rule, see Eric J. Moutz, Janssen v. Best and Flanagan: At
Long Last, The Beginning of the End for the Auerbach Approach in Minnesota?, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 489, 504–09 (2003).
125. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889.

3. Hogg-Triggs.docx

2009]

11/18/2009 1:29 PM

WELL-PLEAD DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS

89

126

oversight by the board.
Therefore, up to this point, Minnesota law suggested that
substantive judicial review of the process followed by an SLC might
be appropriate for deciding whether the SLC was independent and
127
acted in good faith. In the course of the UnitedHealth litigation,
specifically when the SLC report arrived on Federal District Court
Chief Judge Rosenbaum’s desk, he expressed concerns about the
report and found the need to ask the Minnesota Supreme Court
for advice. He observed:
The Special Litigation Committee[’s] . . . lack of any
findings leaves no tracks showing why or how its business
judgment can be considered reasonable. . . . Ultimately,
the Court asks whether Minnesota law makes an SLC an
impenetrable “black box,” whose decisions and evaluative
processes are immune from review in a shareholders’
derivative suit. Put another way, does the business
judgment rule foreclose any action, beyond the Court’s
128
rubber stamping an SLC’s decision?
As the reader will see, the Minnesota Supreme Court answered
his question, but may not have solved the problems he raised.
IV. IN RE UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION
A. Facts and Procedure
In March of 2006, a Wall Street Journal article suggested that a
number of different corporations in this country were possibly
129
One of the companies mentioned was
backdating stock options.

126. See id. at 889–90.
127. See Moutz, supra note 124, at 511. Moutz explains that
Janssen did not directly address the propriety of these decisions, but it did
present a framework that, if followed in subsequent decisions, would
seem to suggest that a less-deferential approach to special litigation
committee decisions is now the law of Minnesota. The precise contours
of this new approach have yet to be defined by the courts, but the
fundamental logic of Janssen and strong public policy concerns suggest
that a version of the Zapata or Miller approaches may be appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
128. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007) (referring to
MINN. STAT. § 480.065, subdiv. 3 (2006)).
129. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1.
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130

UnitedHealth, a Minnesota corporation.
According to the
article, Dr. William McGuire, who was then UHG’s CEO, received a
large block of options that just happened to be dated the day UHG
stock prices hit their low for the year—“unusually propitious”
131
timing. The Journal article, referring to a pattern of such awards,
stated that “the odds of such a favorable pattern occurring by
132
chance would be one in 200 million or greater.” The article also
133
mentioned that an SEC inquiry was underway.
Why would “backdating” be a problem? The “date” of the
grant would fix the strike price for exercise of the option and the
potential value of the option would be the difference between that
strike price and the market price at date of sale of the shares
134
This potential profit spread would be
subject to the option.
magnified by choosing as the date when the grant was allegedly
135
Granting
issued a time when the UHG stock price was low.
options with a strike price below the market price prevailing as of
the date the option was granted would involve breach of the rules
136
and policies established by board as well as shareholder action.
Moreover, it would require complex adjustments to UHG’s
137
Issuing UHG financials
accounting for the cost of such options.
that failed to account for such adjustments, if required, would
constitute the provision of false information to persons buying and
138
Stockholders would be led to
selling UHG stock on the market.
conclude that UHG employee wages were less—and thus profits
139
were more—than they actually were.
Shortly after the Wall Street Journal article was published, the
SEC notified UHG that it had commenced an informal inquiry into

130. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d
544, 548 (Minn. 2008).
131. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1.
132. Id. See also SLC Report, supra note 9, at 5.
133. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Verified Derivative Action Complaint ¶ 4, In re UnitedHeath Group,
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 0:06-cv01216-JMR-FLN), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1036/UNH_01/
2006329_o01c_060121.pdf.
137. See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A2, ¶ 12.
138. See SEC Complaint, supra note 2.
139. See id. “[Backdating] caused investors to believe, falsely, that the
Company granted options with strike prices equal to the fair market value of
UnitedHealth stock on the date of grant.” See id. ¶ 4.
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140

UHG’s stock option granting practices.
UHG then appointed a
committee of directors to review UHG’s stock option granting
141
This committee then retained the Wilmer Cutler law
practices.
142
firm as counsel to assist in this review. Following a very intensive
study and investigation, Wilmer Cutler reported to the committee
that “[t]he measurement dates used by the Company for most of
the option grants . . . under review were incorrect, and many of the
143
Grants to senior officers
option grants were likely backdated.”
144
The
were approved by the board’s compensation committee.
chair of that committee also chaired an ad hoc committee
appointed in 1999 to negotiate the long-term employment
145
The
contracts for the CEO and the president at that time.
employment contract for the CEO assured the grant of 1,000,000
146
options.
Significantly, the report noted that during this time frame, the
chair of the compensation committee served as “a trustee for two
trusts for the benefit of each of Dr. McGuire’s children,” managed
assets for the CEO that fluctuated “from approximately $15 million
in 1996 to over $55 million in 2006,” and “accepted an investment
of $500,000 from Dr. McGuire in connection with [the chair’s]
repurchase of the money management firm that bears his
147
name . . . .” Stock option grants, the report noted, were regularly
approved by written action of the board’s compensation
committee, and for a substantial number of these grants it was
“determined that the Written Actions that were ‘[d]ate[d]’ on a
148
specific date were executed subsequently.”
The wave of litigation had commenced earlier. On March 29,
2006, shareholders filed a derivative suit in federal district court in
Minneapolis against various current and former officers and
149
The shareholders alleged breaches of
directors of UHG.
140. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, REPORT TO THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., available at
http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/assets/shared/Wilmer_Hale_Report.pdf
[hereinafter Wilmer Cutler Report] (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Id. at 8.
148. Id. at 5.
149. See Verified Derivative Action Complaint ¶ 1, Brandin v. McGuire, No.
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150

fiduciary duty, and their suit was later consolidated with various
151
Additionally, another lawsuit was filed in
other derivative suits.
the Minnesota district court, alleging violations of federal securities
152
laws and seeking court approval of the suit as a class action. The
lead plaintiff in this suit was California Public Employees’
153
Retirement System (CalPERS). On April 24, 2006, a shareholder
filed a state derivative suit in Hennepin County District Court,
154
which was consolidated with other state court actions.
On October 31, 2008, UHG announced it had reached an
155
Without admitting
agreement to settle the SEC’s investigation.
or denying the SEC’s allegations, UHG agreed to a permanent
injunction against any future violations of certain reporting, books
and records, and internal accounting control provisions of the
156
federal securities laws.
The SEC brought civil actions against both the former CEO
and former general counsel that resulted in very large financial
penalties and other injunctive relief. “[T]he parties reached a
settlement in which [the CEO] agreed to return $400 million to
157
UnitedHealth and pay a $7 million civil fine.” In settling the SEC
action, McGuire agreed not to “make or permit to be made any
public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in
the [SEC] complaint or creating the impression that the complaint
158
is without factual basis.”
When the Wilmer Cutler report became public on October 15,
2006, the former CEO tendered his resignation, and on the same
06CV01216, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2006).
150. Id.
151. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra
note 4.
152. Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws,
Krause v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., No. 06 CV 1691 ADM/JSM, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P
943442006 2006 WL 2427400 (D. Minn. May 5, 2006).
153. See Order Designating Lead Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel, In re
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., No. 06-cv-01691 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2006),
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1036/UNH_01/2006914_f01x_061691.pdf.
154. See State Consolidated Derivative Complaint, supra note 5.
155. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of SLC’s Motions for
Preliminary Approval and Dismissal, In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., No. 06-1216 (JMR/FLN), 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Oct. 31,
2008), 2008 WL 4843870.
156. UnitedHealth Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 86 (Dec. 31,
2008), available at http://unitedhealthgroup.com/invest/2008/Final_10-K_2008.pdf.
157. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d
544, 548 (Minn. 2008).
158. Id.
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date the former general counsel left his position, retiring from
159
The chair of the compensation
UHG at the end of the year.
160
committee resigned that same month.
Earlier, on July 19, 2006, UHG had responded to the derivative
suits by creating a two-member SLC under Minnesota Statutes
161
section 302.241A, subdivision 1. In its report, the SLC listed legal
defenses pertaining to each derivative claim, yet acknowledged that
162
It recommended a settlement and
most claims had merit.
dismissal of the claims against the former CEO and the other
163
defendants for both the state and federal derivative suits.
The proposed settlement called for the former CEO to
relinquish approximately $320 million in UHG stock options,
surrender his rights to his UHG retirement plan and executive
savings plan, and relinquish any claim he might have had to post164
The “total economic value” McGuire
employment benefits.
would relinquish under the settlement amounted to approximately
165
$420 million. The proposed settlement also called for the former
general counsel to repay earnings from the exercise of options in
the amount of $20.55 million, relinquish rights to severance
benefits of $1.95 million, and relinquish options to purchase
166
273,000 shares with a value of approximately $5.5 million.
Together with earlier transactions, the total value relinquished to
167
Finally, a proposed settlement
UHG was $30.7 million.
agreement recommended binding arbitration with the former
Chair of the Compensation Committee over the fair settlement

159. SLC Report, supra note 9.
160. Id. at 17.
161. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 548. Both SLC members formerly served
on the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. The two members furthermore sought
guidance from Professor Lyman P.Q. Johnson regarding matters of corporate law
and governance; Krolls Litigation Consulting and Forensics practice on
accounting issues; and Professor Brad Cornell of CRA International on issues
regarding economics and damages. SLC Report, supra note 9.
162. See, e.g., SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.B. Until the SLC completed and
issued its report, McGuire was prohibited by a preliminary injunction placed by
the federal district court in the district of Minnesota on November 29, 2006, from
“exercising any UnitedHealth stock options without court approval.” In re
UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d. at 548.
163. SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.B.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ IV.C.
167. Id.
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B. Judge Rosenbaum’s Misgivings
Upon reviewing the SLC materials, Judge Rosenbaum,
presiding over both the direct and derivative actions filed in the
169
The end
Minnesota Federal District Court, expressed concerns.
result, he suggested, would still allow the former CEO to retain
170
$800 million.
Moreover, the SLC report contained no specific
findings or reasons supporting the SLC’s conclusions that the
derivative claims should all be dismissed:
The Special Litigation Committee has apparently made a
business judgment favoring settling the Board’s and
UHG’s possible claims against its former officers on terms
outlined in its report. But its lack of any findings leaves
no tracks showing why or how its business judgment can
be considered reasonable. Its business judgment may
close the inquiry, leaving a Court mute, and charged only
with the ministerial duty to sign off on the deal and
dismiss the derivative suit. Or there may be other
alternatives.
Ultimately, the Court asks whether
Minnesota law makes an SLC an impenetrable “black
box,” whose decisions and evaluative processes are
immune from review in a shareholders’ derivative suit.
Put another way, does the business judgment rule
foreclose any action, beyond the Court’s rubber stamping
171
an SLC’s decision?
Since Judge Rosenbaum was unsure whether he had authority
under Minnesota law to review the reasonableness of the SLC’s
172
he certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the
decision,
following question: “Does Minnesota’s business judgment rule
foreclose a court from a) examining the reasonableness of, or b)
rejecting on the merits, a settlement of a derivative action proposed
by a Special Litigation Committee duly constituted under

168. Id. ¶ IV.D.
169. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. In trying to find the answer, the district court briefly summarized the
history of Minnesota’s case law and statutes, yet it could find no decisions
affirming the Auerbach rule from the Minnesota Supreme Court; hence, it did not
have the sufficient precedent to be certain. See id. at *6–7.
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173

C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision and Underlying Analysis
The supreme court’s majority opinion began by reformulating
the question asked and stating the question it would answer as
follows:
To what extent does the business judgment rule as
recognized in Minnesota law require a court, in deciding
whether to approve a proposed settlement of a
shareholder derivative action, to defer to the decision of a
Special Litigation Committee duly constituted under
Minn. Stat. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (2006), that the derivative
174
action should be settled on specific terms?
The supreme court answered that judicial review was to be
limited to the issues of independence and good faith and that the
business judgment rule precluded judicial review of the substance
175
Thus, the answer to Judge Rosenbaum’s
of the SLC decision.
question was “no,” the court could not examine the reasonableness
of the SLC’s decision or reject it on the merits, unless the court’s
review addressed, and was confined to, the two factors of
176
Justice Paul Anderson’s
independence and good faith.
concurring opinion would have found a basis for the court to
177
review the rationality of the SLC report.
Plaintiffs had argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1(c) trumped the applicability of the Minnesota business
judgment rule to the SLC report because it required that the
derivative suits could be “settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
178
The supreme
compromised only with the court’s approval.”
court held that the comparable Minnesota rule was procedural and
not substantive, and therefore not applicable to Judge
179
Rosenbaum’s decision. The Court left the federal rule for Judge
173. In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544,
549 (Minn. 2008) (quoting In re UnitedHealth, 2007 WL 4571127, at *8).
174. Id. at 549.
175. Id. at 561.
176. Id.
177. See infra Part IV.D.
178. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 552 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.1(c)).
179. Id. UHG was a Minnesota corporation; hence, the Federal District Court
of Minnesota needed to apply the substantive law of Minnesota. See Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts handling diversity cases
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Rosenbaum to interpret and apply if appropriate.
In later
granting approval to the SLC report, Judge Rosenbaum did not
181
invoke the federal rule.
To answer the certified question as reformulated, the
Minnesota Supreme Court defined a standard of review for SLC
reports and decisions. The court chose to adopt and follow the
Auerbach (New York) line of authority rather than the Zapata
182
In following Auerbach, the court concluded it
(Delaware) line.
“should defer to an SLC’s decision to settle a shareholder
derivative action if (1) the members of the SLC possessed a
disinterested independence and (2) the SLC’s investigative
procedures and methodologies were adequate, appropriate, and
183
pursued in good faith.”
The court apparently intended to separate one issue, as to
whether findings and reasons were required, from the other issue
of whether the SLC used appropriate “investigative procedures and
184
To justify excluding inquiry beyond the
methodologies.”
procedures and methodologies, the court argued that “findings
and reasons” were part of the substantive action of the SLC and
185
The court’s
thus not subject to judicial requirement or review.
analysis, from statutes to public policy, set out its rationale for
adopting the Auerbach approach.
1.

The Court’s Quest for Statutory Guidance

The court observed that “section 302A.241, subd. 1, does not
addresses [sic] the deference to be afforded an SLC’s decision to
settle a derivative action . . .” but does however mandate
186
independence on part of the SLC. The court then looked to the
fiduciary duties of directors as provided in Minnesota statutes:

to look to the substantive law of the state in which the federal court was located).
180. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 552.
181. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F. Supp.
2d 1151 (D. Minn. 2009).
182. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556.
183. Id. at 559. Adding to this standard, the court re-affirmed the Janssen rule
and stated that “if the initial SLC investigation and recommendation fail to satisfy
this standard, ‘the derivative suit proceeds on its merits’ with no opportunity to
rectify any deficiencies.” Id. (quoting Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876,
889 (Minn. 2003)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (quotations added).
186. Id. at 553.
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A director shall discharge the duties of the position of
director in good faith, in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances. A person who so performs those duties is
not liable by reason of being or having been a director of
187
the corporation.
The court acknowledged the good faith requirement as set out
above but did not apply the “reasonably believes” wording to the
decision of an SLC duly appointed under Minnesota Statutes
188
The court’s failure to apply this
section 302A.241.
reasonableness clause motivated Justice Paul Anderson’s departure
189
In his view, an SLC decision should
in his concurring opinion.
be subject to a rationality standard in addition to the disinterred
190
independence and good faith standards of Auerbach.
2.

Seeking Help from Case Law

Since neither section 302A.241 nor section 302A.251 expressly
191
directs courts to look beyond good faith and independence, the
192
court looked to its past opinion in Janssen v. Best & Flanagan.
That decision however, gave no clear guidance on the issue of
scope of review because the Janssen court neither accepted nor
rejected the business judgment rule as applicable to an SLC’s
193
In Janssen, the issue rather turned on the court’s
decision.
194
finding that the SLC was in fact not independent.
Without controlling precedent or statutory guidance, the court
195
The court
compared Auerbach and Zapata on a policy analysis.

187. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008).
188. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 553, 559–60.
189. See infra Part IV.D.
190. See infra Part IV.D.
191. See MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.241, 302A.251 (2006).
192. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 551 (referring to Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003)).
193. Id. at 554. Janssen established the minimum requirements of good faith
and independence; however, the decision “explicitly declined to ‘adopt a
particular version of the business judgment rule’” and rather assumed that the
Auerbach standard would still apply. In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., Nos. 06-CV-1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 26,
2007) (quoting and referring to Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5).
194. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 554 (citing Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888).
195. See id. at 554–55.
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adopted the Auerbach standard for the same reasons emphasized in
196
the Auerbach decision. However, the supreme court added its own
policy justifications: (1) corporate interests do not always mandate
litigation, even when harm has been caused by one of the
197
198
directors; (2) strike suits would increase if courts could inquire
199
into the substantive reasonableness of SLC decisions; (3) the
possibility of judicial bias is potentially greater than that of
200
directors; and (4) courts should not replace business judgments
in the name of public policy because courts do not have to deal
with the long term economic consequences of a full litigation
201
proceeding.
The court believed that SLCs are trustworthy since “it seem[s]
unlikely that a member of an SLC will reach a decision that could
harm the company merely because he or she feels some empathy
202
The court justified this
for the individuals under investigation.”
statement with three general assertions: (1) SLCs were composed
of individuals who spent their careers building business
reputations; (2) since the SLC members in the UnitedHealth case
were former members of the judiciary, the risk of improper
influence was insignificant; and (3) derivative suits are not at risk of
being completely undermined by the court’s adoption of the
203
Auerbach standard.
D. Justice Anderson’s Concurrence: The Idea of a Rationality Standard
Justice Paul Anderson concurred with the majority in its
decision to uphold the settlement, yet he believed the standard of
196. See id. at 556–57.
197. Id. at 557.
198. Strike suits are defined as “suit[s] . . . often based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated
settlement.” Id. at 550 n.4 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed.
2004)).
199. Id. at 557.
200. This reasoning was based on the theory by Stephen M. Bainbridge, which
asserted that market competition between firms creates incentive to “even the
most self-interested directors” to act in the best interest of their corporations. Id.
at 558. Courts to the contrary have no market forces encouraging them to make
sensible business judgments. Id. at 557–58 (referring to Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 122 (2004)).
201. Id. at 557. The court also noted that the burden of proof was on the
corporation to establish compliance with the standards. Id. at 561.
202. Id. at 558.
203. Id. The court finalized the rationale for its rule with the specific
circumstances of the case—namely, that the suit was settled. Id. at 559.
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204

review needed a rationality requirement.
He argued that the
court’s
standard
gives
excessive
deference
to
SLC
recommendations because it fails to address decisions that are “on
205
Such a result, he argued, conflicts
their face, wholly irrational.”
with the language of section 302A.251, which requires a director
who seeks protection of the business judgment rule to act “‘in a
manner [he or she] reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person
206
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.’”
Justice Anderson argued the good faith standard was
insufficient to deter irrational decisions by SLCs because good faith
requires belief that one’s actions best serve the interests of the
corporation, whereas rationality requires that such a belief be
207
In other words, he argued that a director may have
reasonable.
good intentions for the corporation and yet make a decision that is
208
so irrational it violates Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251.
Justice Anderson proposed a “middle-ground” approach which
retains the requirements set forth in the court’s opinion only with
the additional requirement that the SLC’s recommendation be
209
Unlike the
shown to serve some “rational business purpose.”
standard in Zapata, a reasonableness standard would not allow the
autonomy and authority of the directors (respect for the business
judgment rule) to be encroached upon by the courts because it still
prohibits the courts from second-guessing SLC decisions by mere
disagreement over which corporate interests deserve the greatest
210
He argued that the risk of any potential overconsideration.
stepping would be diminished by the low probability that an
independent investigation, conducted in good faith, would lead a
211
sophisticated group of members to reach a senseless conclusion.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITEDHEALTH DECISION
The UnitedHealth decision precludes courts from reviewing the
substance behind an SLC’s decision to dismiss a derivative suit so
204. See id. at 561–62 (Anderson, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 562.
206. Id. at 563 (citing MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2006)).
207. Id. (referring to the definition of good faith, which is stated in MINN.
STAT. § 302A.011, subdiv. 13 (2006)).
208. See id.
209. Id. at 564–65.
210. See id. at 565.
211. See id. at 565–66.
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long as the SLC is found to be independent, applies appropriate
212
SLCs do
procedures in the investigation, and acts in good faith.
213
not have to specify why the derivative suits should be dismissed.
Therein lies the central problem: confining judicial review to the
SLC’s procedures and independence will not protect corporations
when SLCs make irrational decisions or fail to document their
decisions with findings of fact and well reasoned conclusions.
Up front, the majority’s notion—that substantive review
contradicts the business judgment rule—misstates the business
judgment rule’s true meaning.
Even directors who are
214
Wrongful
disinterested must not wrongfully refuse to sue.
demand is characterized by the failure of directors to act “in an
informed manner and with due care, in a good faith belief that their
215
This version
action was in the best interest of the corporation.”
of the business judgment rule is not confined to Delaware cases;
Minnesota also holds directors to this standard when demand is
216
made by the shareholders.
The UnitedHealth majority nevertheless refused to hold SLCs to
the same expectation even though the SLC members were making
the same decision the directors would have made had they been
217
Consequently, SLCs can dismiss derivative suits
disinterested.
wrongfully without repercussions because the Auerbach standard
merely ensures the SLC will assert that they followed appropriate
218
Beyond that, they can make their decisions for
procedures.
212. See id. at 555 (majority opinion). The court admits that “some judicial
analysis of the manner in which a decisionmaker gathers the factual data
underlying a decision” is acceptable under Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251,
subdivision 2 (2006). Id. at 559. Also, while the decision pertained to a proposed
settlement, the court clarified that the standard should apply to all SLC decisions,
regardless of their specific recommendations. See id. (stating that “the dismissal of
meritorious litigation may be justifiable, such as when pursuit of the claim will
prove more costly than beneficial.”).
213. See id.
214. See supra note 62.
215. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1615 (quoting Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d
194, 197–98, 210 (Del. 1991) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del.
1984))).
216. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 551 (noting that a business director is
protected “[u]nder the business judgment rule, so long as a disinterested director
makes ‘an informed business decision . . . .’”) (quoting Janssen v. Best & Flanagan,
662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003)).
217. Id. at 564 (Anderson, J., concurring).
218. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 821, 872 (2004) ("If substance is beyond review, any amount of process
can be overcome to reach the desired result: the decision maker need only hear
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reasons unrelated to their factual findings, or worse, they can reach
their decisions without making any factual findings. Without some
level of review, courts have no way of testing the appropriateness or
adequacy of the processes used or the true disinterestedness of the
members.
The court may have been unwise to adopt the Auerbach
standard. Instead, the court should have adopted the Zapata
standard because (1) it is more consistent with Minnesota statutes;
(2) it addresses problems associated with tainted boards selecting
their own SLC committees; and (3) it provides a basis for crosschecking on true disinterestedness and appropriate process. As has
been pointed out above, the court may have been overly influenced
by the personal make-up of the UHG SLC and may not have
focused on the fact that the standards enunciated would apply
equally to a small company (where temptations could be much
219
more serious) as to a large public company.
A. Statutory Support for a More Enhanced Review
As earlier stated, the Minnesota statute requires a director to
make decisions “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
220
circumstances.” The court stated that the choice of whether to sue
221
It
or not is a business decision belonging to the corporation.
follows that even decisions to sue must be made reasonably to enjoy
222
Strangely, the UnitedHealth
business judgment rule protection.
court concluded differently.
Subdivision seven of section 302A.241 states that SLC members
223
“are deemed to be directors for purposes of section[] 302A.251.”
By cherry picking only some requirements from this section, the
court gave short shrift to section 302A.241, which states that all
requirements under section 302A.251 pertain to committee
224
225
members, including SLCs. True, the statute does not expressly
the evidence before rejecting it.").
219. Their credentials are strongly established. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶
I.D.
220. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008) (emphasis added).
221. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 550.
222. See § 302A.251, subdiv. 1; see also supra note 27.
223. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 7 (2008).
224. See id. (stating committee members are “directors” for purposes of section
302A.251).
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226

require SLCs to make reasonable decisions.
Fundamentally,
however, the plain meaning stems from the context of the statute
as a whole, not solely the technical choice of words in a single
227
provision.
Overall, the Minnesota statutes require courts to review the
reasonableness of SLC decisions just as they should review decisions
228
It seems
of other committees or decisions of the board itself.
unlikely that the legislature would wish SLCs to substitute their own
personal preferences and opinions for the minimum standards of
reasonable decision-making because section 302A.241, subdivision
6 articulates that neither the establishing of a committee nor acting
as the committee relieves directors of liability from the duty of care
229
in section 302A.251, subdivision 1.
Corporations favor the use of SLCs when corporate directors,
by reason of conflicts of interest, may not be trusted to serve the
230
Given the SLC’s purpose and
corporation’s best interests.
function, its decision should reasonably serve these interests in the
same way a corporate director, if not conflicted, would serve
231
Because the UnitedHealth standard prevents courts from
them.
225. See § 302A.241, subdiv. 1 (“Committees may include a special litigation
committee . . . .”).
226. See § 302A.251, subdiv. 1. But cf. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 559
(applying section 302A.251, subdivision 1 to SLCs to support its holding that SLCs
be independent and act in good faith). The majority in UnitedHealth relied on an
article that asserted the difference between the business judgment rule and the
business judgment doctrine; the former pertains to the protection of directors
who make reasonable business decisions and the latter protects the decisions
themselves. Id. at 551 n.6 (citing Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the
American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the
Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611–12 (1984)). Nonetheless, the article notes
that “the essential elements of the doctrine and the rule are the same.” Hinsey,
supra at 612. Later in its opinion, the UnitedHealth court renames its application of
the business judgment rule as the “business judgment liability rule” for the sake of
distinguishing it from section 302A.251, subdivision 1 and excluding the
reasonableness requirement. See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 553 n.8.
227. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2004); Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink, 739 N.W.2d 148,
153 (Minn. 2007).
228. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 7 (2008) (stating committee members
are deemed directors for purposes of section 302A.251); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251,
subdiv. 1 (2008) (requiring directors to act reasonably).
229. See § 302A.241, subdiv. 6.
230. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance, the Role of Special Litigation
Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 84–87 (1993).
231. Section 302A.241 likewise imposes the same requirements on committees
regarding the procedures as those that are imposed on corporate directors. See
§ 302A.241, subdiv. 4.
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assessing the reasoning behind SLC conclusions, section 302A.251
232
is significantly deprived of its intended effect.
B. Structural Bias and the Problems with Tainted Boards Selecting the
SLCs
When demand is excused, courts may not trust defendant
directors; yet, to manage the resulting lawsuit impartially,
Minnesota statutes permit the same group of directors to appoint
233
Such is the situation
individuals who will handle the same task.
234
even when corporate directors face serious claims of self-dealing.
By networking, directors can potentially “shop” for SLC members
whom they believe will decide the outcome in their favor.
Historically, SLCs have nearly always settled or dismissed
235
This trend is consistent with the potential for
derivative suits.
structural bias in the selection of SLC members. “Structural bias”
has been described as occurring when “the judgment of seemingly
disinterested directors—who are not defendants in a litigation or
participants in a wrongdoing alleged in a litigation—is inherently
corrupted by the ‘common cultural bond’ and ‘natural empathy
236
and collegiality’ shared by most directors.”
The UnitedHealth majority noted that the federal district court
would decide whether the SLC was independent, yet suggested that
appropriate factors to consider in making this decision included
(1) any possible interest the SLC members might have in the
237
litigation; (2) their affiliations through prior business dealings or
232. See infra Part VI.
233. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 1.
234. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that directors have a “fundamental responsibility and authority for
corporate management”).
235. See id. at 210 (recognizing the inherent risk that committee members will
always be hesitant to recommend litigation); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that
Isn’t a Rule—the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 641–42 (2002). See
also George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 105–09 (1980) (arguing that the
use of special litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative suits in most
cases).
236. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1765 (citing James D. Cox, Searching for
the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI
Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962, 1008 (1982)).
237. This includes:
(1) whether the members are defendants in the litigation; (2) whether
the members are exposed to direct and substantial liability; (3) whether
the “members are outside, non-management directors”; (4) whether the
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relationships; (3) whether the SLC members received advice from
counsel or “other independent advisors”; (4) the severity of the
238
alleged conduct; and (5) the size of the SLC.
In response to the concerns over structural bias, the
UnitedHealth majority argued that SLC members are discouraged
from making biased decisions because SLC members empathize
239
with the well being of the corporation; their concern for their
own reputation overrides any urge to make unreasonable decisions
240
for the sake of the directors; and they are far enough outside the
corporate ranks for any empathy they might have for the directors
241
to actually affect their decisions.
But whether this test truly ensures independence may depend
on how structural bias can affect SLC decision making. Thus,
before analyzing the independence test in UnitedHealth, the reader
should understand the two pertinent psychological aspects of
structural bias: in-group association and cultural similarity.
1.

In-Group Bias

James Cox and Harry Munsinger published an article on
242
in which they examined the Robbers’ Cave
structural bias,
243
This study involved two groups of young men at a
experiment.
244
summer camp. The experimenters assigned each group different
245
After the tasks were completed, the
camping tasks.
experimenters held competitions between these two groups and
members were on the board when the alleged wrongdoing occurred;
[and] (5) whether the “members participated in the alleged
wrongdoing[.]”
In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 560
n.11 (Minn. 2008) (quoting 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1746–53).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 558.
240. Id.
241. Id. Notably, the members comprising the SLC in UnitedHealth were
former members of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. at 548. Even if this were to
make one feel a greater sense of trust in the SLC’s recommendation, not all SLCs
have former justices since Minnesota statutes do not require SLC members to have
judicial experience. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 2 (2008) (requiring only
that committee members be “natural persons”).
242. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83 (1985).
243. Id. at 100–01.
244. Id. at 100.
245. Id.
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discovered, as a result of their in-group chemistry, both groups
246
They later
became increasingly hostile towards one another.
merged the two groups and assigned tasks that required
247
cooperative efforts. As a result both groups then interacted more
248
positively. Despite popular assumptions, the competitions did not
249
Shortly after the experimenters
primarily cause hostility.
separated the groups, and prior to the competitions, both groups
jeered at one another, signifying that the separate grouping
250
created negative tension between both groups.
Although camping activities and corporate governance
constitute significantly different activities, they can induce the same
251
The age difference between
psychological force: in-group bias.
the campers and corporate directors doesn’t change this; Cox and
Munsinger referred to another study where experimenters gave two
groups options to distribute monetary rewards and penalties to in252
Each
group members, members from the other group, or both.
group not only preferred awarding benefits to in-group members,
they “[maximized] the difference between their own group and the
other group, even though that strategy caused them to forsake a profit
253
maximizing option for their ingroup.”
In-group bias occurs because people value the sense of
254
Likewise, SLC members value being selected to
belonging.
255
handle derivative suits. Because they were selected by directors,
256
Consequently,
they may associate this value with the directors.
they and the directors may become one group, separating
257
derivative or class action plaintiffs into an outside group. Given
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 101.
253. Id. (second emphasis added).
254. “[I]ndividuals associate and maintain their membership in groups that
make a positive contribution toward their social identity, from which they derive
emotional or value significance. A further benefit derived from membership in a
group is its contributions to the members’ sense of self-worth.” Id. at 102.
255. “As seen earlier, individuals place great value on their selection to and
membership on a corporation’s board: They are attracted to their colleagues and
value greatly the associations they reap from the directorship.” Id. at 104
(referring specifically to SLC members in the context of derivative suits).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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this rivalry, the reader may guess why SLCs persistently recommend
dismissal of derivative suits.
2.

Cultural Bias

While most SLCs do not purposefully favor the directors’
interests to the corporation’s detriment, their association with the
board causes them to agree with the directors, even in good faith,
258
over which action best serves the corporation’s interests.
However, in-group bias alone does not cause this trend.
Friendships between directors grow during their tenures and thus
259
become the source of income and prestige many directors need.
SLC members who are selected tend to be individuals with whom
the board has shared experiences, whether through business
transactions, business backgrounds, social gatherings, or common
260
acquaintances. Due to these circumstances, the duty of making a
judgment regarding the board members tends to exacerbate the in261
As a result, the SLC members and defendants
group favoritism.
may develop a common perspective vis-à-vis plaintiffs, which then
causes SLCs to favor the defendants despite possible contrary
262
indications.
The UnitedHealth court recognized friendships as one of
several considerations to use in determining an SLC’s
263
independence, but this standard is often too intangible to apply.
From a policy standpoint, precluding SLC independence on the
grounds of close friendships would render SLCs useless because
most corporate executives have already been acquainted with
264
Moreover, cultural bias
individuals from similar backgrounds.
does not depend on established friendships to affect an SLC
258. See supra Part V.B.
259. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 242, at 104.
260. Id. at 107.
261. Id.
262. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 821, 859 n.158 (2004) (citing a number of reports on the effects
friendships have on the investigatory process, including Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 71, 86 (2002); Linda R. Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1537 (2000)).
263. Velasco, supra note 262, at 843.
264. See Velasco, supra note 262, at 859 (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1051–52 (Del. 2004) (asserting that prior business acquaintances coupled
with the attendance of multiple social events was not enough to “rebut the
presumption of independence.”)).
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member’s perspective; the sharing of a common background
265
increases mutual attraction and consequently ethnocentrism.
The cultural bonds, sense of association, and complexity of shared
tasks exert extra psychological force when occurring together
266
within an SLC member.
3.

The UnitedHealth Standard Underestimates Structural Bias

As shown earlier, structural bias can impact decision making to
a significant degree, which explains the likely reasons for an SLC’s
common tendency to dismiss a derivative suit. While the
UnitedHealth factors provide a detailed disclosure of an SLC
member’s history with the company, structural bias cannot be
267
In-group bias and cultural bias
remedied by background checks.
can exist without prior business dealings, material interests in the
suit, or interactions with board members because they stem from
268
the selection process. These biases exist in groups of all sizes and
impact decision making regardless of the severity of the alleged
269
conduct.
Of course, the UnitedHealth factors remain important
for consideration, but do not, by themselves, establish that SLCs are
truly independent.
The court’s generalizations about the SLC’s incentives to resist
their personal biases may overlook two realities behind the SLC’s
decision making process. First, an SLC member’s empathy for a
corporation is no stronger than that of the director, yet the latter
270
has never discouraged directors from committing misconduct.
265. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 242, at 105.
266. See id. at 104 (“This synergism creates compelling psychological forces
toward ingroup biases within the . . . special litigation committee.”).
267. But even then, establishing these factors typically does not disqualify the
board. If some factors are shown to exist, as long as an SLC member did not
participate in the alleged misconduct, courts are commonly hesitant to question
the independence of the SLC. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1755. One
court even acknowledged that “[b]usiness dealings seldom take place between
complete strangers and it would be a strained and artificial rule which required a
director to be unacquainted or uninvolved with fellow directors in order to be
regarded as independent.” Id. (quoting In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437,
1442 (N.D. Cal 1993)).
268. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 242, at 104.
269. See id.
270. Dr. McGuire is our case in point. Prior to the backdating scheme, he
served UHG as its director for seventeen years, fifteen of which he spent as the
chair. See SLC Report, supra note 9, at 7. He was furthermore accredited for
helping “the Company’s revenues [grow] from approximately $600 million to
more than $70 billion, with an average annual return to shareholders of nearly 30
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Second, SLC members are not as distant from the corporate ranks
as the majority presumes. As shown above, from the moment they
are selected, SLC members may feel a sense of association, which
271
Because the UnitedHealth
can seriously impact their decisions.
standard precludes courts from reviewing the findings and reasons
behind the SLC’s recommendations, the reasoning and motives of
these committee members may not be disclosed, not even in cases
where the facts could materially contradict the rationale behind
their recommendations.
On the other hand, the Zapata standard provides an
opportunity—not a requirement—for thorough judicial review.
Under this standard, the court can examine findings, reasoning
and conclusions, and thus, verify the true independence of the SLC
272
Surely, a
members in the processes they used and applied.
plaintiff who established that the complaint was well-pleaded or
that the lawsuit should be certified as a class action should be
entitled to no less.
C. Difficulties in Confirming Good Faith and Adequacy
The problem resulting from structural bias is worsened by the
fact that the standard adopted by the court prevents judges from
testing the “honesty” of the SLC’s investigation. None can refute
the principle that the final conclusions of an SLC should be based
273
The
on the facts. Good faith, after all, means “honesty in fact.”
SLC’s duty to make well-informed decisions means that its decision
274
By issuing their report, the SLC
should be based on findings.
members represent to the court that they base their
275
recommendations on what they discovered in the investigation.
percent.” Id.
271. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.
272. There have been cases where SLC members’ independence was refuted
by the substance of their findings. See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp.
348, 350–51, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 714 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
found that regardless of whether the SLC conducted a procedurally adequate
investigation, their conclusions and recommendations were not reasonably
supported by the facts. Id. at 354.
273. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subdiv. 13 (2006).
274. See In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544,
551 (Minn. 2008).
275. In every conclusion, the UHG SLC begins by saying “[i]n light of the
many factors it considered . . .” and “[i]n light of these considerations . . .” and
“critical to its consideration was the lack of evidence supporting the pursuit of
these claims . . . .” See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.A–F. These are all assertions
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Yet, the Auerbach standard contains no mechanism for verifying, if
276
necessary, that this representation is true.
Thus, in the UHG SLC report, the SLC members listed the
277
pertinent laws and thoroughly explained their procedures.
However, as Judge Rosenbaum pointed out, they did not provide
factual findings and analysis in a manner that would explain and
278
justify their recommendations.
Omitting substantive support
does not demonstrate bad faith, yet, it inhibits the court from
ensuring the SLC investigated and managed the derivative suit in
good faith.
The Zapata standard fixes this problem. Delaware requires
plaintiffs who challenge the independence of SLCs to show that the
committee members “based [their] conclusions . . . on . . . outside
279
Upon a proper
influences rather than the merits of the issues.”
showing, the court reviews the substance of the SLC findings to
determine whether the SLC conducted its investigation without any
280
extraneous influence.
Requiring substantive support for their
conclusions and recommendations ensures that SLC directors
actually base their decisions on the merits of the case.
VI. DEBATABLE CRITICISM: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE
ZAPATA STANDARD
The UnitedHealth court rejected the Zapata standard for seven
281
reasons, but none of these policy justifications obviate the need
to scrutinize SLC decisions to the extent discretionally permitted by
Zapata.
to the court that the SLC based its recommendations on the facts discovered from
the investigation. See id.
276. The question of adequacy “is solely how appropriately to set about to
gather the pertinent data.” Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634 (1979)
(emphasis added). The court went on to say that “[w]hat has been uncovered and
the relative weight accorded in evaluating and balancing the several factors and
considerations are beyond the scope of judicial concern.” Id.
277. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ II–III.
278. Id.
Without providing any factual support, they based their
recommendations on conclusions that only “some of the claims against Dr.
McGuire may have merit” or that some defenses “might be available to him.” Id.
at 59.
279. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1755 (quoting Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d
1184, 1190 (Del. 1985)).
280. Id.
281. See In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544,
556–58 (Minn. 2008).
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The court’s first argument, that judges are unqualified to
evaluate business judgments, departs from established businessjudgment-rule law and undervalues the fact that an SLC report is
(or should be) a combination of a recital of processes used,
283
The court’s second
findings made, and reasoned conclusions.
concern emphasized the complexity of second-guessing SLC
decisions; however, judicial review does not have to involve
investigation or second-guessing of the business judgment exercised
284
by the SLC. What should be reviewed is the process used and an
assurance that it was not tainted by arbitrary behavior. The fact
remains that in most derivative cases, shareholders accuse directors
of disloyalty. Judges undisputedly are the experts in this issue
because it stems from the legal nature of one’s conduct, not from
285
complex balancing of business interests.
The court’s third argument—that SLC directors need to be
able to prevent litigation when they believe it would do more harm
286
than good —is true, but arguably not to the point. Nowhere in
the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion did the Zapata majority
287
If the SLC
suggest that courts must review all derivative suits.
genuinely finds the claims to be meritless or the litigation costs to
be prohibitive, it can easily persuade judges with its substantive
findings of fact and reasoning. Zapata even stressed that a court
“must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate
288
interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit.”
The Zapata standard encourages judges to consider corporate
289
The
interests just as strongly as does the Auerbach approach.
UnitedHealth court’s opinion may overlook the fact that the
Auerbach standard can be especially troublesome in the context of
suits affecting small corporations in that it undermines the
290
opportunity of judicial review for arbitrary decision making.
282. Id. at 556.
283. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1980).
284. See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556, 566 n.8 (Anderson, J.,
concurring).
285. Cf. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789 n.18 (stating that courts, not litigants,
decide the merits of litigation).
286. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556–57.
287. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 779. Even in Delaware, SLC decisions to dismiss
derivative suits are rarely overturned. See also infra note 293.
288. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1980) (emphasis added).
289. There have been no signs of widespread arbitrary disagreements leading
courts to overturn SLC conclusions. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
290. The ALI has suggested that because a small corporation is less separated
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The UnitedHealth court’s fourth and fifth reasons, that Zapata
291
would waste judicial resources and undermine the corporate
292
autonomy needed to prevent strike suits, simply presume that the
Zapata standard creates an express lane for shareholders with
meritless claims. Both arguments overlook the fact that Delaware
293
courts rarely dismiss SLC decisions for lack of reasonable basis
because the Delaware pleading standards require shareholders to
allege the facts needed to justify a “reasonable doubt” that the SLC
294
More
action is protected by the business judgment rule.
importantly, the shareholders must allege such facts “with
295
This requirement means that courts will not
particularity.”
overturn an SLC motion to dismiss a derivative suit every time the
plaintiffs generally assert that the SLC’s report or investigation was
296
negligently or dishonestly conducted. Hence, they still grant SLC
297
decision-making the very strong benefit of the doubt.
The sixth concern for the UnitedHealth court was that, “[A]
court applying its ‘business judgment’ is prone to act on its own
biases and predilections. Ironically, then, Zapata simply replaces
the danger of bias on the part of the corporate directors and the
298
This
SLC with the danger of bias on the part of the court.”
argument appears to discount or ignore the expertise of courts in
reviewing fairness and adequacy of process in contexts where the
courts have no specific background in or knowledge of the
from its shareholders, a compelled termination of a derivative suit by a separate
committee would be less appropriate. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §
7.01 cmt. e, at 21 (1992). The policy reasons justifying derivative actions are “not
always applicable to the closely held corporation.” Id. Moreover, corporate
boards are less likely to be disinterested in smaller firms because “the majority
stockholders are likely also to be the firm’s managers.” Id.
291. See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 557.
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 75
(Del. 1997); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985); Carlton Invs. v.
TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1165, 1173 (1997).
294. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1614 (quoting Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d
194, 210 (Del. 1991) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984))).
295. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1614.
296. See id.; see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del.
1981) (stating that if the SLC shows that its investigation was reasonable,
independent, and in good faith, the court may dismiss the derivative suit on the
derivative plaintiff’s motion).
297. See In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d
544, 551 (Minn. 2008) (stating that a court will defer to the decision of an SLC
where the board properly delegates its authority to act to the SLC).
298. Id. at 557.
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particular subject matter involved. Under the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence, for example, a court may require a medical expert to
provide a factual basis underlying his or her ultimate opinions even
though the court itself is not equally qualified in the field of
299
medicine.
Finally, the court characterizes Zapata’s allowance for judges to
consider public policy as “troubling,” in that it “compels a party to
proceed with litigation because some greater public good, as
determined by a court that will not have to live with the
300
Simply put, the
consequences of the decision, might result.”
UnitedHealth court assumes that Zapata will allow courts to prioritize
301
This assumption is
public policy over corporate interests.
overstated and perhaps takes the Zapata language out of context.
The Zapata opinion stated that public policy “when appropriate”
would be considered “in addition to the corporation’s best
302
In other words, the
interests,” not in place of those interests.
Zapata decision encourages courts to sometimes consider public
policy factors, such as due process, but not to render decisions that
303
serve the public at the expense of the corporation.
All seven of the Court’s policy arguments center on important
considerations, yet none of them seem to deal adequately with
balancing the risks of failing to detect arbitrary or worse actions by
an SLC. The outstanding credentials and experience of the two
SLC members involved in the UnitedHealth case may have distracted
the Court’s attention from the kinds of situations that, in the
future, will be reviewed under the instructions of its opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION
UnitedHealth undoubtedly resulted in a sound decision and
disposition of the litigation involved in that case. The credentials

299. See MINN. R. EVID. 703 (the facts which the expert relies upon must either
be admissible or reasonably relied upon); see also MINN. R. EVID. 705 (the court may
require an expert to disclose the facts underlying his or her conclusions).
300. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
301. See id.
302. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (emphasis
added).
303. Most importantly, the Zapata method of public policy considerations is
supported by the Minnesota statutes, which provide that “[i]n discharging the
duties of the position of director, a director may . . . consider . . . community and
societal considerations . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (2008).
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304

and expertise of the SLC were impeccable.
Judge Rosenbaum
appears to have accepted that decision and applied it in granting
305
Whether, as
approval to the settlement as arranged by the SLC.
Judge Rosenbaum questioned earlier, the former CEO should be
permitted to retain (according to the Judge) “pelf” in the amount
306
of $800 million, and whether any responsibility of the former
chair of the UHG Compensation Committee, who was apparently
307
involved in at least part of the options issues, should be tied to an
arbitration to determine the value a lawsuit against him might have,
are interesting questions. It seems appropriate to respect the SLC
determination that “enough was enough” and that reasonable
justice had been or would be done.
If the reader takes two steps back from the decisions, however,
several facts become clear. UHG paid $895 million to settle the
308
class action, with up to $64 million in legal fees; UHG agreed to
an SEC-imposed injunction (without admitting liability),
prohibiting future violations of the federal securities laws in several
309
the SLC extracted additional recoveries of
specific ways;
substantial value from the former CEO and the former general
counsel, both of whom had been enjoined by the SEC from
310
denying that they violated the federal securities laws; and UHG
was forced to restate its financials for a period of several prior years
due to the overstatement of income and the understatement of
311
expense associated with the options backdating.
Do these facts raise a possible inference that the UHG board
failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities in an adequate
manner? Did any members of the board, other than the former
CEO, the former Chairman of the Compensation Committee, and

304. The report provides irrefutable credentials of both former Minnesota
Supreme Court Justices. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ I.D.
305. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F.
Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. 2009).
306. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV1216, 06-CV-1692, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. 2007).
307. He did resign following issuance of the Wilmer Cutler report. See Wilmer
Cutler Report, supra note 140.
308. See STANFORD REPORT, supra note 3.
309. Id. (Under the terms of a proposed settlement agreement, UHG paid
$895 million into a settlement fund for the benefit of class members; UHG will
also supplement the changes already implemented in its corporate governance
policies.).
310. See SLC Report, supra note 9.
311. See id. at 31.
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former General Counsel, face any repercussions? Were the monies
paid out by UHG covered by insurance? If the value of the lawsuit
against the former chair of the Compensation Committee had
substantial value in the SLC-negotiated binding arbitration, were
that person’s legal costs, if any, covered by indemnification by
UHG and thus by the shareholders? Did anyone on the board,
other than the former CEO, suffer any financial consequences as a
result of these “troubles”?
Were members of the board
responsible? Were they entitled to rely on representations and
reports of the former CEO and other officials?
None of these questions appear to have been answered in any
public forum—they have been disposed of by the SLC decision to
312
dismiss all of the derivative cases and the presumptive acceptance
313
of the settlement by the class action plaintiffs.
Given the
decisions of the SLC, what can be said of the accountability, if any,
of members of a board of directors? Has anyone asked whether it
might be appropriate to seek recovery of director’s fees and stock
options from any director who shares responsibility for this fiasco?
UHG’s option “troubles” are now apparently near an end. But
the real significance of the UnitedHealth case will be found in the
way in which it is applied to similar upcoming corporate situations.
Here, the future is troubling.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established that the
corporation making use of an SLC to manage or dismiss derivative
suits has the burden of proving (1) that the members appointed to
serve on the SLC are disinterested, (2) that the procedures they
314
As
used were reasonable and (3) that they acted in good faith.
shown above, courts cannot effectively verify good faith or
disinterestedness without first seeing how the procedures support
an SLC’s conclusions. Because neither findings of fact nor
reasoned conclusions can now be required nor reviewed by a court,
Minnesota courts, and federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction where Minnesota law applies, are essentially restrained
from verifying either disinterestedness or good faith.
These possible consequences of the UnitedHealth standard
potentially reflect an impediment to holding directors accountable
for their misconduct. Despite the exceptional credibility and
312. SLC Report, supra note 9.
313. See 10Q Report, supra note 13.
314. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d
544, 559 (Minn. 2008).
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credentials of the SLC members in UnitedHealth, we might see
problems in the future in which SLC members, who possess
substantially less credentials or credibility than the two incumbents
in this case, can help directors avoid accountability by producing a
report which proposes dismissal of pending lawsuits without
showing any findings of fact or reasons for the decision.
In light of this situation, there are two possible ways in which
the State could improve review of future SLC reports. The first is
for new legislation to require courts to follow the Delaware Zapata
standard in the future. After all, the UnitedHealth decision is no
more than an interpretation of Minnesota Statutes sections
315
The second is for courts to press for
302A.251 and 302A.241.
detailed information to support the corporation’s burden of proof
that the SLC in question “utilized appropriate investigative
procedures and methodologies and pursued its investigation in
316
By enabling courts to verify how the SLCs’
good faith.”
recommendations
stem
from
proper
procedures
and
methodologies, these implementations could ensure that director
accountability is not dissipated by use of SLC investigations and
reports.

315.
316.

MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.251, 302A.241 (2006).
See id. at 555.

